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I.  Introduction 
Much recent research on wage formation and unemployment has focused on the distinction  
between insiders and outsiders in the labor market.  A common theme is that employed 
workers (insiders) have bargaining power that allows them to demand high wages although 
there are unemployed outsiders queuing for jobs.  The more bargaining power insiders have, 
the higher are wages and  the lower is employment. But the link between insider bargaining 
power and employment is due to an ad hoc constraint that is typically imposed on the wage 
contract: all workers are paid the same wage.
1  Thus, the wage that insiders get is also the 
wage at which firms hire outsiders.  But if unemployed outsiders are queuing for jobs, then 
the surplus to be shared between the firm and the insiders could be increased by setting a low 
starting wage. If this were done there would be no necessary connection between insider 
bargaining power and employment (see Frank (1985), Frank and Malcomson (1994)).
2  It 
should not be in the insiders´ interest to create an inefficiency by pricing outsiders out of the 
market, but to hire outsiders as long as their marginal product exceeded their alternative 
income.
3 
In practice, recently hired workers are sometimes paid less than senior workers, but 
in many sectors the difference is small and unemployed workers often appear to be ready to 
take jobs at lower starting wages than those currently prevailing.  In fact, a recent 
questionnaire study shows that, in Sweden, attempts to underbid are not unusual but such 
offers are usually turned down by firms (Agell and Lundborg (1995)). Furthermore, the 
seniority wage schedule appears relatively rigid: a percentage wage increase negotiated in a 
collective agreement typically applies not only to those workers employed at the time of the 
bargain, but also to those to be hired during the contract period.  So the question arises why 
insiders should use their bargaining power not only to raise their own wages, but also to raise 
                                                 
1 Insider-outsider models where all workers are paid the same wage have been used to explain the persistence of 
unemployment (Blanchard and Summers 1986, Gottfries and Horn 1987, Lindbeck and Snower 1987, Burda 
1990, Drazen andGottffries 1994, Gottfries and Westermark 1998), the fact that labor contracts typically specify 
wages, but not employment (Oswald 1993), and nominal wage contracts (Gottfries 1992). 
2 See also Gollier (1989,1991) and Fehr's (1990) comment on Lindbeck and Snower (1988).  The latter assume 
that when new workers are hired they are paid their reservation wage, and the firm decides unilaterally about 
hiring and firing. Insiders may harass outsiders so as to raise outsiders' reservation wages to avoid being replaced 
and improve their own bargaining position. Again there appear to be ad hoc constraints on the contract. In their 
setup one would expect the contract to specify the starting wage and also to give insiders priority in employment 
- as is typically the case in real union contracts. 
3 Of course, this is true also in the case when the union cares about all workers.  Kuhn and Robert (1989) 
consider a monopoly union with a senior and a junior worker and argue that for a given seniority ranking there 
should be little distributional conflict between the workers.  Both workers should agree to set the junior wage as 
high as possible without the junior worker losing his job.  Hence there is no involuntary unemployment in their   2
starting wages.  Why are starting wages "linked" to the wages paid to insiders/senior 
workers?  
A plausible argument against low starting wages - or payments for jobs, or bonds 
posted by workers - is that firms would have an incentive to cheat, to replace expensive 
insiders by cheap new workers. There are typically ways in which the firm can make such 
replacements without this being observed by other workers or by the union.
4  In order not to 
give the firm an incentive to replace insiders, the difference between the insider wage and the 
starting wage must not be too large. However, there may be more efficient ways to protect 
insiders from being replaced. A natural way would be to stipulate in the contract that the firm 
should make a severance payment to all insiders that are fired. However, such payments may 
also be associated with incentive problems.  Whether a worker leaves the firm or not often 
depends on the actions of both the firm and the worker, making the distinction between fires 
and quits unclear.  Payments may then be made also to workers who effectively quit, 
increasing the turnover of workers.  
In this paper we consider the design of labor contracts taking account of the incentive 
effects discussed above. We allow the starting wage to be lower than the insider wage and 
payments to be made to workers who leave the firm. But, following Carmichael (1983), 
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and others, we assume that other workers (or a third party) 
cannot observe the reason for a separation, so payments cannot depend on who initiated the 
separation. Employed workers (insiders) get outside offers randomly drawn from an 
exogenous distribution. A "double" incentive problem arises because workers have private 
information about their outside offers and the firm can make workers quit in a way that is not 
observed by other workers or a third party.
5  
Under these conditions, payments to (all) workers who leave the firm have two 
different effects. On the one hand, they protect insiders from being replaced and thus make it 
possible to reduce starting wages, which raises the surplus to be split between the firm and the 
                                                                                                                                                          
model. 
4 Arguments of this type are common in the "efficiency wage" literature.  Other explanations why workers do not 
pay for jobs are that they may be credit constrained and that firms may cheat by selling a job and then 
immediately claim that the worker shirked and dismiss the worker, so unemployed workers would be unwilling 
to make such payments.  The first is contradicted by the observation that workers typically appear to be happy 
that they get a job which would not be the case if payments for jobs cleared the market (see Carmichael (1985)).  
The second is subject to the objection that it should be relatively easy to detect if a firm systematically dismisses 
recently hired workers. Another argument is that when bargaining takes place on the industry level, the union has 
incentive to raise the starting wage so as to limit supply and raise the product price in the industry.  This 
argument seems relevant in many situations, but the starting wage appears to be linked to the insider wage also 
when bargaining takes place on the firm level or in an industry subject to intense international competition. 
5 For example, the firm may change the working conditions in such a way that some insiders quit.   3
insiders. On the other hand, they stimulate quits which are costly to the firm. We show that, 
depending on the parameter values, two different types of contracts may arise. The effect of 
insider bargaining power on employment is different in the two cases.  
In Case 1 turnover is important, and the bargaining power of insiders not too strong. 
Payments to workers who leave the firm are optimally set to zero in order to reduce turnover 
costs. (In fact, it would be efficient to charge a fee from quitting workers, but we assume this 
is not feasible.) In this case there is a close link between the insider wage and the starting 
wage, and an increase in bargaining power for the insiders raises the starting wage. Thus we 
can rationalize the type of contract that is postulated in most models of union wage 
bargaining.  
How does an increase in insider bargaining power influence employment levels 
in this case? As it turns out, this depends on contract length. With long-term contracts an 
increase in the starting wage reduces employment, so that an increase in insider bargaining 
power has a negative effect on employment. However, when contracts are frequently 
renegotiated, the firm suffers from a commitment problem: the firm cannot credibly promise 
to pay high wages in the future, so turnover is high. In this case, a permanent increase in 
insider bargaining power is beneficial to the firm since it functions as a commitment to pay 
permanently high wages, which reduces turnover. With a lower turnover, the firm is willing to 
hire more workers, so employment increases!  Thus, if contracts are renegotiated very 
frequently, then this commitment problem is severe, and an increase in insider bargaining 
power can increase profits and employment, as well as wages. 
In Case 2 insiders have a lot of bargaining power. The wage is high relative to 
alternative offers, and workers are unlikely to quit even if they are paid for quitting. Then, 
turnover is not much of a problem and the best way to protect insiders is to stipulate in the 
contract that payments should be made to workers who leave the firm - a form of "golden 
parachutes" for employees. In this case, the starting wage may be substantially lower than the 
insider wage and an increase in insider bargaining power does not affect employment.  
In practice, payments to workers who leave appear to be small in most countries, at 
least for regular employees, suggesting that Case 1 is the common one and that increased 
bargaining power of insiders will indeed raise starting wages.  With (implicit or explicit) long 
term contracts, this reduces employment.  
The arguments made here are closely related to arguments made in the literature on 
"efficiency wages", particularly by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989,1992). They analyze 
bonding in a shirking model with a "double incentive problem": workers can shirk and firms   4
can falsely claim that the worker has shirked and replace the worker. They find that bonds (or 
payments for jobs) are not helpful at all as a way to redistribute surplus between the parties., 
However, they did not analyze the consequences of insider bargaining power and another 
difference is that we focus on incentive problems associated with turnover rather than 
shirking.
6  
In Section II we describe the model, and analyze hiring and quits.  The optimal 
contract is characterized in Section III. Discussion follows in Section IV. 
 
II.   The Model 
We consider optimal contracts between a firm and its insiders, with unemployed outsiders 
ready to take any job they can get. All workers who were employed in the previous period are 
insiders.
7  The contract specifies an insider wage, w, a starting wage, ω, and a payment to be 
made to workers who leave the firm, z.  Because of imperfect information, a number of 
incentive constraints affect the form of the contract: 
i) insiders (or the union) cannot monitor the total number of workers quitting, being 
hired, promoted etc. Thus the contract cannot stipulate the number of workers to be hired, nor 
can payments to individual workers dependent on what happens to other workers.
8  
ii) insiders get outside offers, which cannot be observed by the firm or by other 
insiders. Thus payments to workers cannot depend on outside offers - only on whether the 
worker continues to work for the firm or not.
9  
iii) the firm controls the work environment and it can take some unobservable action 
so as to induce (some) insiders to quit. Similarly, a worker may make himself useless, thus 
forcing the firm to fire him.  Thus payments cannot depend on who initiates the separation.  
Payments made to workers who leave the firm will be called separation payments.
10   
                                                 
6 We focus on turnover rather than shirking because the standard shirking model appears less relevant for 
unionized labor markets with a high degree of job security. In many European countries, the firm can openly 
dismiss a worker only if he has misbehaved very seriously, but the firm may be able to replace insiders in more 
indirect ways, e.g. by inducing insiders to quit. Recent survey studies such as Agell and Lundborg (1995, 1999), 
Campbell and Kamlani (1997), and Bewley (1998) find little support for the shirking model but do support the 
turnover model. 
7 We assume that insiders have bargaining power as a group because of their capacity to take collective action 
against the firm. Since insiders have firm-specific knowledge it is prohibitively costly for the firm to replace all 
insiders. 
8 This assumption excludes contracts where the firm has to pay a “fine“ to the remaining insiders if an insider is 
replaced, promotion ladders and hiring limits.  These alternatives are discussed in the final section. 
9 We do not allow lotteries. Moore (1985) considers a contract where the probability that a worker is retained 
depends on what he says about his outside offer. 
10 We use the term "separation payment" rather than severance or redundancy payment to mark the fact that these 
payments do not depend on who initiates the separation of the worker. In practice there are of course cases where 
it is clear who initiated the separation.  What is important for our argument is that there are a substantial number   5
iv) because of enforcement problems, workers who leave cannot be charged a fee.  
Thus the separation payment has to be nonnegative.  
The standard turnover model (Salop (1979)) does not suffer from the double 
incentive problem discussed in the introduction. If the starting wage differs from the insider 
wage by an amount equal to the training cost, the firm does not have any incentive to fire a 
trained worker and the outcome is Pareto efficient (see Salop (1979), Akerlof and Yellen 
(1986)). In effect, workers pay for their training and turnover is not costly to the firm. In 
contrast to the standard model, we assume that separations induced by workers are more 
costly to the firm than those induced by the firm. There are several reasons why this is 
plausible. Voluntary quits imply unpredictable loss of expertise and disruptions in production. 
The most productive workers are more likely to get good outside offers while the firm will 
tend to replace insiders with low productivity if it gets the opportunity.
11 We do not introduce 
heterogeneity explicitly, however, but simply assume that voluntary quits are costly for the 
firm.  
Given these constraints, there are two ways to make sure that the firm does not 
replace insiders.  One is to set a high starting wage; the other is to set a high separation 
payment. Both methods have disadvantages: high starting wages "waste" money on outsiders 
while payments to workers who leave the firm stimulate voluntary quits, which are costly to 
the firm. As we will see, the choice of method will depend on the bargaining power of the 
insiders and the importance of turnover costs. 
 
Sequence of events  
The firm and the workers are risk neutral and infinitely lived and discount the future with 
discount factor β.  The number of workers employed in period t is denoted nt.  All employees 
who have worked for at least one period in the firm are insiders.  Thus, the firm enters period t 
with nt-1 insiders. Contracts have a stochastic length: an existing contract is prolonged to the 
next period with exogenous probability ρ and ceases to hold with probability 1-ρ.  We think 
of contracts as being long-term implicit contracts - promises - which extend beyond the length 
of formal contracts, so ρ is close to unity.
12  In each period, events occur in three stages as 
                                                                                                                                                         
of cases where one cannot readily make the distinction.  When some firings masquerade as voluntary quits, and 
conversely, incentive problems of the type discussed here will arise.   
11 If the productivity of individual workers is not observed by other workers, a union contract cannot differentiate 
wages according to productivity. 
12  This specification is chosen because it allows us to model the longevity of contracts in a simple way.  
Implicitly, the probability of breakup may reflect the probability that new circumstances make the old contract 
irrelevant.     6
follows.  
In Stage 1 nature decides whether the contract survives from the previous period or 
not. A contract survives with probability ρ. If the contract survives, wages and separation 
payments remain unchanged.  If the old contract “dies“, the firm and the insiders agree on a 
contract that specifies the insider wage, w, starting wage, ω, and separation payment, z.  Since 
our interest is in the form of the contract rather than what determines bargaining power and 
the level of the wage, we use a rather simplistic model of bargaining.  We simply assume that 
a contract must give each insider an expected present value of income which is at least equal 
to some exogenous number U .  Thus the value of U  implicitly reflects the “bargaining 
power“ of the insiders.
13 
In Stage 2 all insiders independently draw outside offers, and a fraction qt of the 
insiders quit.  Each worker who quits costs the firm θ.  
 In  Stage 3 the firm unilaterally decides which fraction of insiders to replace, rt, 
and how many new workers to hire. Since some workers quit in each period, the normal 
situation is that the firm hires some new workers in every period and we therefore focus on 
such a situation.
14  The hiring (training) of each new worker costs c.  Then production occurs 
and wages are paid.  Output is a concave function of employment, F(nt), and the product price 
is normalized to unity. For a given contract (w,ω,z), profits in period t are 
 
F(nt) - w (1 - qt - rt) nt-1 - (ωt + c) (nt - (1-qt - rt) nt-1) - (z + θ) qt nt-1- z rt nt-1.   (1) 
 
The only uncertainties in the model concern the values of outside offers received by 
individual workers and the survival of the contract.  To analyze the model we start with the 
last stage. 
 
Stage 3: The Incentive Constraint and Employment  
Let us first consider whether, for a given contract, the firm has incentive to replace an insider 
by a new employee (outsider). If the firm keeps the insider it must pay his wage, w. If the firm 
replaces the insider it must pay the new worker the starting wage ω, a training cost c, and the 
insider who is forced to leave is paid a separation payment z. Since new workers become 
insiders after one period, replacement of insiders does not affect future profits.  From (1) we 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the relevant threats in bargaining, see Gottfries and Westermark (1998). 
14 Also, the purpose of the paper is to explain the starting wage, which cannot be observed if the firm does not 
hire.   7
see immediately that if w > ω + c + z, then the firm will replace as many insiders as possible. 
We assume that the (expected) loss of utility for an insider who is forced to leave the firm at 
Stage 3 is sufficiently high that the contract will be designed in such a way that the firm does 
not replace insiders.
15  Thus, the following No Cheating Constraint must be satisfied: 
 
ω > w - z - c.        (2)  
 
There is excess supply of outsiders and the contracting parties do not take account of the 
interests of the outsiders.  Since the firm and the insiders raise their joint surplus by reducing 
the starting wage, they will always reduce ω to the point where the No Cheating Constraint 
holds with equality:
16   
 
ω + c = w - z.      (3)  
 
  In the following we assume that (3) holds, so the contract is fully characterized 
by the the vector (w,z). Now consider the firm's choice of employment.  When the firm 
decides about employment, the contract (w,z) is given and a fraction qt of the insiders have 
left at Stage 2.   The firm maximizes the present value of profits.  We use V(nt,w,z) to denote 
the present value of profits from period t+1 onwards if the contract (w,z) survives to that 
period, and Φ(nt) to denote the present value of profits if it does not survive. Using the fact 
that ω + c = w - z, and thus rt=0, we can write the firm’s objective at Stage 3 of period t as 
 
F(nt) - w nt + z (nt -n t-1) - θ q t n t-1 + βρ V(nt,w,z) + β(1-ρ)Φ(nt).   (4) 
 
Using subscripts on functions to denote derivatives, the first order condition with respect to nt 
is:  
 
Fn(nt) + βρ Vn(nt,w,z) + β(1-ρ) Φn(nt) = w -z .   (5) 
 
The left hand side of (5) is the benefit of hiring one more employee, which consists of today’s 
addition to output, and the discounted value of having one more insider in the future. The 
                                                 
15 Recall that the insiders remaining at this stage are those who did not get any acceptable offers in Stage 2. 
16 A formal proof is straightforward.   8
right-hand-side is the marginal hiring cost  ω+c, which equals  w-z  due to the No Cheating 
Constraint.  
 
Stage 2: Quits 
Each period every insider gets an outside offer.  The present value of the outside offer is a 
stochastic variable x drawn from a distribution with distribution function G(x).  We use 
U(w,z) to denote the present value of income for an insider with contract (w,z) at the 
beginning of a period - before he has observed his individual outside offer for that period.  An 
insider who accepts an outside offer worth x gets x+z.  An insider who stays gets w this 
period and from next periods onwards he gets U(w,z) if the contract is prolonged, and U  if a 
new contract is negotiated.  Thus, the insider will reject an outside offer worth x if and only 
if: 
 
  x + z ≤ w + βρ U(w,z) + β(1-ρ)U .     (6)   
 
The probability that a worker stays with the firm is therefore G(w - z + βρ U(w,z) + β(1-
ρ)U ) and the fraction of insiders quitting is  
 
  Q(w,z) = 1 - G(w - z + βρ U(w,z) + β(1-ρ)U ).   (7) 
 
Typically we would expect that only a minority of the workers would get acceptable outside 
offers so that, with a unimodal distribution  G’’(w -z + βρ U(w,z) + β(1-ρ)U ) < 0  in the 
relevant region, and this is assumed in the following.  U(w,z) is implicitly defined by 
 
 U(w,z)  =  ∫ max(w  + βρ U(w,z) + β(1-ρ)U , x+z ) dG(x).    (8) 
 
Differentiating, we find the derivatives of U(w,z): 
 




















,    (9) 
 
and the derivatives of Q(w,z) are thus: 
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Not surprisingly, quits decrease with the wage and increase with the separation payment.  In 
these expressions G and G’ are evaluated at the value of x which makes the worker indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the outside offer, i.e., x= w + βρ U(w,z) + β(1-ρ)U - z.  
 
 
III.  The Optimal Contract 
In order to specify the contracting problem in Stage 1, we first define the firm’s value 
function for a given contract (w,z): Vn wz t (, , ) −1 .  This function fulfills the Bellman equation: 
 
[] Vn wz n Fn w n zn n Qwzn Vn wz n t
t
tt t t t t t ( ,,) m a x ( ) ( ) (,) ( ,,) ( )( ) −− − =− + − − + + − 11 1 1 θβ ρβ ρ Φ .  
(11) 
 
Using the envelope theorem we find the derivatives of the value function with respect to w 
and z: 
 
  Vn w z n Qw z n Vnw z wt t w t wt (, , ) ( , ) ( , , ) −− =− − + 11 θ βρ ,   (12) 
 
  ( ) Vn w z n n Qw z n Vnw z zt t t z t zt (, , ) , ( , , ) −− − =− − + 11 1 θ βρ .   (13) 
 
  With these prerequisites we are ready to address the main issue: the characterization of 
the optimal contract between the firm and its insiders.  Thus we consider a situation where the 
old contract has ceased to hold and the firm and the insiders negotiate a new contract in Stage 
1 of period t. We assume that the contract is Pareto efficient from the point of view of the firm 
and the insiders, taking account of the relevant incentive constraints.  Thus the contract should 
solve the following maximization problem: 
 
 max ( , , )
, wz t Vn wz −1       ( 1 4 )  
  s. t.   nt-1 U(w,z) ≥ nt-1 U
_
,     (15) 
   10
 and  nt-1 z ≥  0.      (16) 
 
The maximized value of (14) is Φ(nt-1).  The first order conditions are: 
 
  Vn w z nUw z wt t w (, , ) ( , ) −− + = 11 0 λ ,        (17) 
 
  V n wz n U wz zt t z (, , ) ( , ) −− + + = 11 0 λ µ ,          (18) 
 
where µ and λ are nonnegative shadow prices associated with the constraints. 
  Our main question is how increased insider bargaining power, reflected in U
_
, affects 
the starting wage and employment.  Since we want to analyze permanent changes in 
bargaining power, we consider a long run equilibrium where all variables are constant.  

















































0.   (20)
  
  In order to determine equilibrium employment, we first use the envelope 
theorem to find the derivative of V with respect to lagged employment (i.e., the number of 
insiders): 
 
Vn(n t-1,w,z) = - z  - θ Q(w,z),      (21) 
 
and, by another application of the envelope theorem: 
 
Φn(nt-1) = Vn(n t-1,w
e,z
e) = - z
e
  - θ Q(w
e,z




e denote the expected wage in the new contract.  Substituting into (5), using the 
definition of Q(w,z) and considering a stationary equilibrium we get an equation for long run 
labor demand:   11
  
Fn(n) = w  – z + β z + β θ [1 - G(w - z + βU )].   (23) 
  
The forward looking terms in the labor demand function have to do with the fact that a 
marginal insider in the next period is more costly to the firm than a newly hired worker in that 
period.  When  z  is positive, the insider is paid a higher wage, the difference being z, and the 
insider may quit causing turnover costs in the coming period.   
  The solution to the model is characterized by the two first order conditions (19) and 
(20), the two constraints (15) and (16) and the labor demand relation (23).  In order to analyze 
the solution we multiply (19) by (1-ρβ) and add the result to (20) to get:  
 
  µ = 1 - λ.       ( 2 4 )  
 
Since µ must be nonnegative there are two possibilities.   
 
Case 1:   0 ≤ λ < 1, µ > 0  and z = 0.   
 
Case 2:   λ = 1, µ = 0 and z > 0.      
 
Which case is relevant depends on the bargaining power of the insiders and the magnitude of 
the costs associated with turnover.  We now analyze the relation between U , w, z, ω and n in 
each case. 
 
Case 1: z=0. 
This case occurs if insiders have relatively low bargaining power and/or turnover costs are 
unimportant.  To understand it, consider first the situation when insiders have so little 
bargaining power (low U ) that λ=0.  This is a pure efficiency wage model and the constraint 
on z  binds.  The firm would like to charge a fee from quitting workers, but by assumption this 
is not feasible. The wage is set in such a way that the reduction in turnover cost associated 













1,     (25)   12
 
where G and G’ are evaluated at the value of x which makes the worker indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the outside offer, i.e., x= w + βρ U(w,0) + β(1-ρ)U . Equation (25) 
therefore implicitly determines the efficiency wage. 
  Consider now the case when insiders have a little bargaining power (higher U ) so that  
0<λ<1.  In this case z is still optimally set to zero.  The firm and the insiders share the surplus 
and since turnover costs reduce the surplus it is in their joint interest not to stimulate quits.  
Another way to explain this result is to note that the wage set in the efficiency wage case 
(λ=0) maximizes profit so, starting from that wage, a marginal wage increase does not affect 
the level of profit.  An increase in the separation payment, on the other hand, stimulates quits 
which generate turnover costs for the firm.
17  Thus, if insiders have a little bargaining power, 
it is cheaper for the firm to raise w than to raise z above zero.   
  Thus, we have shown that when insiders have some, but not too much bargaining 
power, z is still equal to zero.  A marginal increase in  U
−
 raises w and, since (3) implies that  
ω = w - c, 
 
 d ω/dw  =  1.      (26) 
 
The starting wage increases one-for-one with the insider wage.  Thus, for modest degrees of 
insider bargaining power the starting wage is linked to the insider wage.  
  In order to evaluate the effect of insider bargaining power on employment, we 
differentiate (23) and use the fact that (15) holds with equality.  We find that employment 












≤   .      (27) 
 
Comparing with (25) we see that if contracts are long term (ρ close to one) this condition is 
fulfilled for wages equal to or higher than the “efficiency wage“.  Thus we have rationalized 
the standard view in the wage bargaining literature: stronger insider bargaining power implies 
higher starting wages and lower employment. 
                                                 
17 Since the starting wage is reduced by the same amount, the separation payment has no direct pecuniary cost to 
the firm.   13
  However, for low values of ρ  (27) may not hold, and employment may increase when 
the wage increases.  To understand this surprising result, consider the case with one-period 
contracts (ρ=0) and no union.  Since wage expectations affect turnover, the firm has incentive 
to promise high wages in the future in order to reduce turnover but with only short-term 
contracts available we rule out such commitments.  Insiders rationally believe that future 
contracts are independent of today’s contract. If the firm sets a high wage today, the insiders 
believe that this will last only as long as the current contract lasts, and that the wage will be 
reduced as soon as the current contract is terminated.  Therefore a wage-increase will only 
have a minor effect on turnover and it does not pay for the firm to raise the wage to a high 
level today. The same is true in future periods. There is simply no way for the firm to 
convince the insiders that future wages will be high since insiders know that the firm has no 
incentive to honor its promise in the future. This leads to a bad equilibrium with a low wage, 
high turnover and low profits and employment.  
  Now reintroduce the union.  If the insider bargaining power is permanently increased, 
workers expect higher wages in the future, and this has a beneficial effect on turnover. Thus, 
with only short-term contracts available, a strong union (i.e., permanently high U ) may 
effectively help the firm to commit to a higher wage, which reduces turnover and raises 
profits and employment.
18  
 In  contrast,  if  ρ is relatively high then the firm is able to make long-term commitments 
on its own and increased insider bargaining power reduces profits and employment. 
 
Case 2: z>0 
As the wage is raised relative to the distribution of alternative offers, turnover becomes less of 
a problem.  When the wage is sufficiently high, marginal payments to quitters will only have 
a small effect on quits and eventually it becomes efficient to raise  z  above zero.  Now, z is 
set according to  
 
  θG´(w - z + βU ) = 1 -G(w - z + βU )].     (28) 
 
This condition says that z should be set so that the firm’s cost of higher turnover associated 
                                                 
18 Alternatively, in line with the Folk Theorem, long-term promises can be supported by trigger strategies if the 
firm is sufficiently patient. If the insiders’ bargaining power U  is temporarily increased for this period only, 
this is unambiguously bad for the firm, since it makes constraint (15) tighter.   14
with an increase in  z  is equal to the benefit to insiders from an increase in z.
19  
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To explain this, note that z  is a one-off payment while a permanent increase in bargaining 
power raises the wage both today and in the future.  Hence z can increase by the present value 
of the wage increase without increasing turnover!  A somewhat surprising consequence is that 










  .      (30) 
 
  What is the effect of U on employment in this case?  A falling starting wage makes it 
cheaper to hire outsiders today, but since hiring today implies less hiring tomorrow, it is only 
the interest rate on z that matters.  Substituting into (23) we find that the net effect on 
employment is zero in this case.
20 
 
To sum up, our main result is that for modest degrees of insider bargaining power the starting 
wage is linked to the insider wage.  The link arises because of the “double“ incentive problem 
discussed in the introduction.  Neither party should have a too strong incentive to terminate 
their relationship since this would be costly for the other side.  A too low starting wage would 
induce the firm to replace insiders and a high separation payment would induce excessive 
quits.  Because the starting wage is linked to the insider wage through a rigid seniority wage 
schedule, an increase in insider bargaining power raises all wages and (with long-term 
implicit or explicit contracts) reduces employment. 
  When insiders have a lot of bargaining power, so the wage is high relative to 
alternative offers and there is little turnover, the firm is not so worried about workers quitting, 
and workers can be protected from misbehavior by the firm by separation payments.  In this 
case, an increase in insider bargaining power has no effect on employment.   
                                                 
19 Note that insiders get  z  with probability 1 - G.  Since ω is set to fulfill the non-cheating constraint, the 
pecuniary cost of an increase in z is recovered by the firm through a corresponding decrease in ω, so the only 
cost to the firm of a higher z is that associated with higher turnover.   15
  The relation between w and ω is thus nonlinear: as insiders’ bargaining power 
increases, ω  first increases one-for-one with  w (Case 1)  and then falls rapidly (Case 2) to the 
reservation wage.  With long-term contracts, employment first falls (Case 1) and then stays 
constant (Case 2). 
 
 
IV.  Discussion 
The efficiency wage theory is often regarded as the main alternative to bargaining theories of 
unemployment. In this paper we have argued that the information and incentive problems 
which are emphasized in the literature on "efficiency wages" may explain features of labor 
contracts which are typically imposed in the wage bargaining literature.   
We investigated the effect of insider bargaining power on employment, allowing 
starting wages to be lower than wages paid to insiders and payments to be made to workers 
leaving the firm. A steep seniority wage schedule may not be incentive compatible because 
the firm would have an incentive to replace expensive senior workers with cheap new hires. 
One way to protect employed workers is to stipulate that "separation payments" should be 
made to workers who leave the firm, but such payments will stimulate quits. When turnover 
considerations are important, payments to workers who leave the firm are set to zero and the 
starting wage is tied to the insider wage to prevent replacement of insiders. 
It should be emphasized that what we explain in this model is a link between the 
insider wage and the starting wage - not that the two must be equal. The model predicts that 
new workers pay their training costs in the form of low starting wages. Similarly, if there is an 
observable productivity differential between previously employed workers and new hires, the 
starting wage may be lower without creating an incentive for the firm to replace insiders. 
However, a modification of the model may change this result. Suppose that there is 
heterogeneity among workers and some insiders are less productive than the average new 
worker, but this is observed only by the firm and all insiders are paid the same wage. Then, in 
order to protect less productive insiders, the starting wage must be higher than the insider 
wage minus the hiring cost. In that case, new workers do not pay the full cost of their training.  
The model predicts a rigid seniority wage schedule: business cycle shocks or other 
factors that change insider wages will not affect the slope of the seniority wage schedule (as 
long as the contract is of the Case 1-type).  The slope of the seniority wage schedule should 
                                                                                                                                                          
20 Eventually, the starting wage will fall to the reservation wage for outsiders.   16
primarily reflect hiring costs and productivity differentials between senior and junior workers.  
A systematic empirical investigation of these predictions is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but many union contracts appear to have these characteristics.  The 1979 contract between 
GM and the United Auto Workers, for example, stipulated the following: 
“New employees shall be hired at a rate sixty (60) cents below the maximum base rate of the job 
classification and shall receive an automatic increase of twenty-five (25) cents at the expiration of thirty (30) 
days.  Every employee who is retained by the Corporation in the job classification shall receive an increase to 
the maximum base rate for the job classification at the expiration of ninety (90) days or as soon as he or she can 
meet the standard requirements for an average employee on the job, whichever occurs first, provided however, 
that deviation from the above ninety (90) day rule may be made pursuant to negotiation between the Local Shop 
Committees and Local Managements, for jobs requiring more than ninety (90) days to attain average 
proficiency.“ 
The starting wage is 5-10 percent lower than the regular wage.  Very similar 
wordings and percentage wage differentials can be found in contracts for other years between 
the same parties.  
We will now briefly discuss three important assumptions which drive our results and 
how modifications of these assumptions would affect the results.  One key assumption is that 
payments to workers who leave the firm cannot depend on who initiates a separation. One 
may argue that in practice it is often clear who initiated the separation and that payments are 
sometimes made to workers that are fired, but seldom to workers who quit.  However, even if 
redundancy and severance payments do occur, they are typically not very large; the amount is 
seldom more than one or two months' pay (see Oswald 1986, Hartog and Theeuwes 1993).
21 
But if the contract would stipulate very substantial payments to be made to workers when they 
are fired, but not when they quit, the firm would have a strong incentive to make workers quit 
when in fact it would like to fire them. Likewise, workers who would like to leave the firm for 
some reason, would have strong incentives to make themselves less useful so as to force the 
firm to fire them. Thus, substantial differences in the payments depending on the cause of 
separation would be associated with serious incentive problems and this is probably one 
reason why actual payments are not very large.  Therefore we think that the assumption that 
payments cannot depend on the reason for the separation is a useful abstraction.   
Another important assumption is that the union cannot prevent that the firm replaces 
some insiders if the wage differential is too large. Clearly, an important activity of unions is to 
                                                 
21 There is some evidence that formal seniority wage scales are more common in high wage industries (Frank 
1994) and extra-statutory redundancy payments are more common in firms with strong union presence and high 
wages (Booth 1987, 1995). Also, severance payments usually depend on years of service (Oswald 1986, Hartoog 
and Theeuwes 1993). These observations are consistent with the view that such payments serve to protect senior   17
monitor job security of insiders and if the union could do this perfectly, greater wage 
differentials could be allowed. What happens as the union becomes more able to monitor 
cheating by the firm? As an intermediate case, we could assume that cheating by the firm may 
be detected and penalized with some probability, so cheating is associated with an expected 
cost for the firm.  Such a cost would affect the "no cheating constraint" (2) so that the wedge 
between the insider wage and the starting wage could be increased. The higher this cost, i. e. 
the better cheating by the firm can be monitored, the steeper will the seniority wage schedule 
be.   
This observation may help to explain differences in wage structures between 
countries and industries. For example, the steep seniority wage schedules and "lifetime" 
employment contracts observed in large Japanese firms are usually explained either as 
incentive schemes or as a reflection of high rates of human capital formation (see e. g. Mincer 
and Higuchi (1988) and Aoki (1990)).  Our analysis suggests that high wages of senior 
Japanese workers may instead have to do with the presence of strong enterprise unions, which 
cooperate closely with management in a "corporatist" fashion.  Well-informed and strong 
unions with a strong presence on the shop floor, transparent systems of performance 
evaluation (job rotation etc.) and a lack of good outside opportunities for employees should 
make it difficult for the firm to replace expensive insiders without reason. These conditions 
may make it possible to enforce a combination of high wages for insiders relative to outside 
opportunities, steep seniority wage schedules and job security of insiders, which is unfeasible 
in other systems. Furthermore, because unions are enterprise unions, they do not try to limit 
industry supply, but find it in their interest that the firm hires young and secondary workers at 
low wages.   
A third important assumption is that the number of workers being hired and fired 
cannot be specified in the contract. Our motivation is that contracts that specify numbers of 
workers require more organization and monitoring than contracts which only specify 
conditions for individual workers.  This assumption excludes contracts where the firm has to 
pay a “fine“ to the remaining insiders if an insider is replaced.  It also excludes “promotion 
ladders“ of the type discussed by Carmichael (1983).  Translating Carmichael´s idea to our 
model, one may argue that insiders could negotiate a fixed number of high-wage positions to 
be distributed among the insiders while the remaining insiders are paid as new workers 
(correcting for hiring costs and productivity differentials).  This would raise the average 
                                                                                                                                                          
workers.   18
income for insiders and the firm would have no incentive to cheat since if it fires a 
“promoted“ insider it will just have to promote another insider.  Aside from the fact that this 
contract requires the union to monitor the number of promotion positions, it also involves 
unequal treatment of insiders, something that may be difficult when insiders are equivalent in 
all respects and have equal influence in the union. 
If numbers of workers could be specified in the contract, another possibility would 
be to limit hiring.  Since this would prevent replacement of insiders, starting wages could be 
reduced to the benefit of the firm and the insiders. Such a contract would resemble an 
apprenticeship system, where apprentice wages are low but the number of apprentices is 
regulated.  In fact, 19th century craft unions usually did not allow apprentices to become 
members and they tried to reduce the number of apprentices in various ways.
22 However, it 
seems that such a contract requires a well-defined and relatively stable trade. With substantial 
variations in product demand and quits, a hiring limit will be impractical.   
Considering the difficulties unions may have monitoring turnover and its causes, the 
best way for insiders to protect their positions and future rents may be to require the firm to 
give away some of the rent if it hires an outsider. 
                                                 
22 Limits on the number of apprentices is a standard feature of traditional apprenticeship systems; an example is 
the Statute of Artificers of 1563 (Davies (1956)). Such limits typically allowed a rather large number of 
apprentices, however, and it is not clear whether the constraints were binding. When craft unions were formed in 
the 19th century, they sometimes tried to reduce the number of apprentices and Sanger(1895) found that a 
substantial number of union contracts in the UK regulated the number of apprentices. By 1960, Liepmann 
reported that limitation of the number of apprentices had with certain exceptions, ceased to be a prominent issue, 
but still, unions tried to use age limits and other regulations in the apprenticeship system to limit entry.    19
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